Why Polymarket and Kalshi Struggle to Predict Midterm Elections

Why Polymarket and Kalshi Struggle to Predict Midterm Elections

Prediction markets like Polymarket and Kalshi face a structural accuracy problem during midterm elections because decentralized, lower-turnout races suffer from thin liquidity, severe demographic skew among traders, and extreme sensitivity to localized polling errors. Unlike presidential contests that attract billions in institutional and retail capital, midterm cycles split trader attention across hundreds of Senate, House, and gubernatorial contracts. This fragmentation creates wide bid-ask spreads and leaves individual markets vulnerable to manipulation by single well-funded participants, ultimately turning price discovery into a reflection of trader bias rather than electoral reality.

For decades, financial journalists and political operatives have treated betting odds as a superior alternative to traditional polling. The theory is seductive. People lie to pollsters, or they simply hang up the phone, whereas people rarely lie when their own money sits on the line. Following the high-profile visibility of crypto-based Polymarket and federally regulated Kalshi during the 2024 presidential cycle, both platforms positioned themselves as the ultimate real-time truth engines for American politics.

Then come the midterms.

Midterm elections are not a single national event. They are a sprawling, chaotic collection of hyper-local contests governed by shifting voter enthusiasm and unpredictable turnout models. When prediction platforms attempt to price these races, the mechanics that make markets efficient in a presidential year begin to break down.

The Illusion of the Wisdom of the Crowd

The foundational argument for prediction markets rests on Friedrich Hayek’s concept of dispersed knowledge. A market aggregates fragments of information held by thousands of independent actors, distilling them into a single, accurate price. If a contract for a Senate seat trades at 65 cents, the crowd believes that candidate has a 65 percent chance of winning.

That math works beautifully when millions of dollars flow through a single order book. It fails when liquidity dries up.

During a presidential race, virtually every dollar of political betting volume concentrates on one primary question. Market makers—professional trading firms that provide liquidity by continuously quoting buy and sell prices—can easily hedge their exposure because the volume is massive and the news cycle is national. In a midterm cycle, that same capital gets divided across 35 Senate races, 435 House districts, and dozens of state-level contests.

Consider a hypothetical example of a competitive House race in a rural district. While the presidential market might boast hundreds of millions in volume, that specific House contract might attract only $40,000 in total trading. In a market that shallow, the "wisdom of the crowd" shrinks to the opinions of maybe fifty active traders. If one passionate supporter—or a political operative looking to generate a favorable headline—drops $15,000 on a candidate, the implied probability can swing by twenty percentage points in minutes. No new information entered the race. A single wallet simply overwhelmed a thin order book.

Who Actually Trades on These Platforms

To understand why these odds drift away from reality, you have to look at who is placing the bets. Prediction markets do not sample a representative cross-section of the American electorate. They sample a very specific demographic.

Whether you look at Kalshi, which operates under the oversight of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and requires traditional bank transfers, or Polymarket, which runs on the Polygon blockchain and settles in USDC stablecoins, the user base leans heavily male, younger, wealthier, and deeply embedded in finance or technology circles.

This demographic homogeneity creates blind spots.

Traders naturally overvalue information sources they consume daily. A surge in podcast appearances, viral clips on X, or momentum on tech-focused forums often triggers immediate buying pressure on prediction platforms. Meanwhile, slow-moving demographic shifts among older suburban voters or union households in the Midwest—groups largely absent from crypto wallets and derivatives exchanges—go underpriced until the ballots are actually counted.

In a presidential election, institutional money eventually steps in to correct these biases. Quantitative funds and seasoned arbitrageurs monitor state-level polling averages, early voting returns, and fundraising data, systematically buying underpriced contracts until the market aligns with statistical fundamentals. During the midterms, the financial upside for those large funds is often too small to justify the research cost. Building a custom turnout model for a single Senate race in Ohio or Nevada requires serious analytical labor. If the maximum liquidity available in that market only allows a fund to deploy $50,000 before moving the price against itself, the big players stay on the sidelines. The retail traders are left to echo their own assumptions back and forth.

The Polling Feedback Loop

Defenders of Polymarket and Kalshi frequently argue that markets beat polls because traders incorporate polls alongside fundraising numbers, historical trends, and breaking news. In practice, midterm markets often become parasitic on the very polling industry they claim to replace.

Because local political intelligence is expensive to gather independently, retail traders rely heavily on public polling aggregators to guide their positions. When a partisan pollster releases a questionable survey showing a sudden surge for an underdog candidate, automated trading bots and anxious retail bettors immediately react. The market price moves. Media outlets then report that "betting odds have shifted dramatically" in the race, treating the market movement as independent validation of the flawed poll.

This creates a dangerous echo chamber. Instead of aggregating unique, ground-level insights, the market simply amplifies public polling noise with financial leverage.

The Turnout Modeling Trap

Midterm outcomes hinge almost entirely on differential turnout—which party’s base actually shows up when the presidency isn't on the ballot. Presidential elections draw roughly 60 to 65 percent of eligible voters. Midterms regularly drop below 50 percent.

Predicting who stays home is the hardest problem in political science. Pollster weighting relies on assumptions about the composition of the electorate. If a pollster assumes the electorate will look like the last presidential cycle, their numbers will miss a wave election by miles. Prediction market traders face the exact same handicap, except they rarely possess the raw cross-tabs or voter-file data necessary to challenge a pollster’s turnout screen. They are essentially trading derivatives on someone else's guesswork.

Regulatory Friction and Market Structure

Beyond the political mechanics, the structural divide between Kalshi and Polymarket creates distinct distortions in how midterm probabilities are formed.

Kalshi operates as a Designated Contract Market regulated by the CFTC. Following its landmark legal battles to offer election contracts to U.S. residents, Kalshi gained access to mainstream American capital. However, regulatory compliance comes with guardrails. Position limits cap how much any single entity can wager on a specific political outcome—often restricting large traders to positions in the hundreds of thousands of dollars rather than tens of millions. While these caps prevent overt market manipulation by billionaires, they also restrict sophisticated institutional market makers from deploying enough capital to keep dozens of simultaneous midterm markets razor-sharp.

Polymarket operates offshore and restricts U.S. users under its terms of service, though international liquidity and crypto-native capital keep its volumes high. Because Polymarket lacks CFTC position limits, massive "whales" routinely take multi-million-dollar positions on single outcomes.

This absence of caps cuts both ways. On one hand, unconstrained capital allows high-conviction traders to absorb bad liquidity and push prices toward efficiency faster than on capped exchanges. On the other hand, it enables concentrated, ideological betting. A single wealthy actor with a political agenda—or a massive hedge against a real-world business risk—can park millions on one side of a midterm Senate race, anchoring the market price at an artificial level for weeks. Arbitrageurs looking to bet against that whale must tie up their own capital until November, sacrificing the risk-free yield they could earn elsewhere in financial markets.

The Time Value of Tied-Up Capital

Financial professionals call it opportunity cost. Retail political junkies rarely calculate it.

Suppose a Senate race in Pennsylvania is genuinely a coin flip, meaning the true probability is 50 percent, yet an aggressive whale pushes the "Yes" shares on a candidate up to 62 cents in August. A sharp trader spots the mispricing immediately. Buying the "No" shares at 38 cents offers a clear mathematical edge.

There is a catch. That capital is locked until the race is officially certified in November—or longer if a recount drags into December. If an investor can earn a guaranteed annualized return in Treasury bills or deploy that cash into faster-moving crypto or equity markets, tying up money for four months to capture a twelve-cent edge on a volatile political event becomes far less attractive.

During a presidential election, the sheer scale of media coverage and trading volume allows sharp traders to exit their positions early at a profit as the market corrects itself over a few days. In lower-volume midterm markets, you often cannot exit a large position without crashing the price yourself. You are forced to hold until settlement. That illiquidity discount keeps smart money away, leaving midterm odds sluggish and prone to lingering inaccuracies.

Every prediction market lives or dies by the clarity of its resolution criteria. When does a candidate officially win an election?

In blowout races, the answer is obvious. Major networks call the race on election night, the losing candidate concedes, and the market settles within hours. Midterm elections, particularly in tight House districts and battleground Senate states, frequently refuse to cooperate with clean timelines.

Automatic recount laws, mail-in ballot curing periods, and aggressive post-election litigation can stretch outcomes out for weeks. Both Kalshi and Polymarket rely on specific rulebooks—typically citing consensus calls from major news organizations like the Associated Press, Fox News, and CNN, or official certification by state secretaries of state—to settle contracts.

When a race enters a legal gray area, trading shifts from predicting voter behavior to predicting judicial rulings and bureaucracy. Market prices become erratic as traders panic over rule interpretations. A candidate might lead in the raw vote count, yet their shares trade at 85 cents instead of 99 cents because traders fear a specific contract clause regarding contested certifications. For outside observers looking at the ticker for a simple read on who won, that price action looks like uncertainty about the votes, when it is actually anxiety about the fine print.

Separating Signal from Noise

None of this means prediction markets are useless during midterm cycles. Even with thin order books and demographic skew, platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket consistently outperform punditry and single isolated polls because they force participants to weigh probabilities rather than deal in binary hot takes. A market trading at 70 percent still communicates far more nuance than a cable news panelist declaring a race "over."

The mistake lies in treating every contract on these platforms with the same level of reverence.

When evaluating midterm odds, the most important number on the screen isn't the percentage—it is the trading volume and the open interest sitting behind it. A Senate contract with $15 million in volume and tight one-cent spreads between buyers and sellers represents a genuine consensus forged through real financial risk. A House contract with $12,000 in volume and a six-cent spread is little more than a glorified message board with a price tag attached.

Until institutional market makers find a profitable way to scale automated liquidity across hundreds of fragmented, local order books simultaneously, midterm prediction markets will remain a fascinating, volatile, and deeply imperfect barometer of American politics.

IG

Isabella Gonzalez

As a veteran correspondent, Isabella Gonzalez has reported from across the globe, bringing firsthand perspectives to international stories and local issues.